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LEAVING A WOMAN'S RIGHT TO A
HEALTH CARE PROVIDER'S CHOICE
MARIA CIRINCIONE*
INTRODUCTION
At thirty-five years of age, Lori Boyer found herself powerless and vulnerable
in the emergency room of Good Samaritan Hospital in Lebanon, Pennsylvania after
a man she knew raped her.' These emotions seem obvious for a woman to
experience after being raped,2 but Lori Boyer was forced to feel these same
emotions for a second time by the emergency room physician who treated her when
she came to the hospital for help. Why? Because her physician refused to provide
her with emergency contraception as part of her post-rape treatment.4 After Lori
requested the morning-after pill, her physician refused to write her a prescription
and told her simply that it was against his religion to do so. 5
Although Lori's story was highlighted by the news media, she is just one
example of the countless other women who have had the same emergency room
experience after being raped.6 Some might even say that Lori was one of the luckier
cases. She, at least, knew enough about the existence of emergency contraception
7
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1. Sabrina Rubin Erdely, Doctors' Beliefs Hinder Patient Care: New Laws Shore Up Providers'
Right to Refuse Treatment Based on Values, MSNBC.COM, June 22, 2007,
http://www.msnbcmsn.com/id/19190916/.
2. See Ann Wolbert Burgess & Lynda Lytle Holmstrom, The Rape Victim in the Emergency Ward,
73 AM. J. NURSING 1740, 1742-44 (1973) (discussing common feelings reported by victims of rape).
3. Erdely, supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. In 2006, the year before Lori Boyer was raped, there were 92,455 cases of rape reported in the
United States. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORT:
CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2006, at 1 (2007), http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2006/documents/
forciblerapemain.pdf.
7. An estimated one in three women does not know about emergency contraception. Erdely, supra
note 1.
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to be able to ask her physician for treatment after having been raped. Like Lori's
doctor, many physicians with conflicting beliefs about emergency contraception
may choose not to even mention the possibility. 8 Thus, women with less knowledge
about emergency contraception may be denied information about their treatment
options and may never even know the difference. 9 Lori was also fortunate because
she had the resources to find another physician on her own who was willing to
provide treatment before the effectiveness period for emergency contraception had
lapsed. 10 Emergency contraception is only effective if administered within seventy-
two hours of intercourse and diminishes in effectiveness as time passes between
intercourse and treatment." Other women may not be as knowledgeable as Lori
and may learn about emergency contraception only after it is too late.
A "conscience statute" or "refusal clause" is a legislative provision that
protects a health care provider "who decline[s] to participate in certain health
services based on a religious or moral objection ....12 These services commonly
include performing abortions, performing sterilizations, and even dispensing
contraception.' 3 Pennsylvania's conscience statute, for example, permits private
institutions to refuse to provide abortions.' 4 Under the statute, an individual
provider at an institution, like Lori's physician in Lebanon, Pennsylvania, could
claim protection from having to treat her with emergency contraception because he
believes that the use of contraception results in an abortion.' 5
While Lori's traumatic experience took place in a hospital in Pennsylvania,
16
a similar situation could just as easily occur in Maryland. Maryland's conscience
8. In one survey published in the New England Journal of Medicine, eight percent of physicians
said they felt no obligation to present all options to their patients. Farr A. Curlin et al., Religion,
Conscience, and Controversial Clinical Practices, 356 NEw ENG. J. MED. 593, 597 tbl.2 (2007).
9. See Erdely, supra note I ("In many cases, women don't even know a doctor is withholding
treatment."). Jill Morrison, senior counsel for health and reproductive rights at the National Women's
Law Center in Washington, D.C. stated that "in a crisis situation, like a rape, you often don't think to
question your care. But unfortunately, now we can't even trust doctors to tell us what we need to know."
Id.
10. Id. After being denied access to emergency contraception by her treating emergency room
physician, Lori met with a rape counselor who was able to find another physician willing to prescribe
emergency contraception later that same day. Id.
11. See infra notes 163-66 and accompanying text (discussing the time period for effective
treatment with emergency contraception).
12. Jane W. Walker, The Bush Administration's Midnight Provider Refusal Rule: Upsetting the
Emerging Balance in State Pharmacist Refusal Laws, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 939,945 (2009).
13. See infra Part I.A-B. (discussing the types of services that providers are protected from
performing in federal and state conscience legislation).
14. 16 PA. CODE § 51.32 (2009).
15. See Holly Teliska, Comment, Obstacles to Access: How Pharmacist Refusal Clauses
Undermine the Basic Health Care Needs of Rural and Low-Income Women, 20 BERKELEY J. GENDER L.
& JUST. 229, 235 (2005) (describing pharmacists who refuse to treat with emergency contraception
because their religious beliefs define the effect of emergency contraception as an abortion).
16. Erdely, supra note 1.
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statute contains even broader protections for providers than Pennsylvania, as it
allows any institution, public or private, and all individual providers to refuse to
provide abortions. 17 The Maryland conscience statute reads in relevant part:
(a) (1) A person may not be required to perform or participate in, or
refer to any source for, any medical procedure that results in artificial
insemination, sterilization, or termination of pregnancy.
(2) The refusal of a person to perform or participate in, or refer to a
source for, these medical procedures may not be a basis for:
(i) Civil liability to another person; or
(ii) Disciplinary or other recriminatory action against the person.
(b) (1) A licensed hospital, hospital director, or hospital governing board
may not be required:
(i) To permit, within the hospital, the performance of any medical
procedure that results in artificial insemination, sterilization, or
termination of pregnancy; or
(ii) To refer to any source for these medical procedures.
(2) The refusal to permit or to refer to a source for these procedures
may not be grounds for:
(i) Civil liability to another person; or
(ii) Disciplinary or other recriminatory action against the person by
this State or any person.
18
The language of the Maryland statute does not explicitly define a provider's duty to
dispense or right to refuse to dispense emergency contraception in emergency
rooms. Thus, ambiguities in the language of Maryland's conscience statute may put
women in Maryland at risk for being denied access to emergency contraception
when needed most.
Access to emergency contraception for emergency room patients is an
important issue that deserves the attention of the Maryland legislature. 19 The
Maryland legislature could guarantee protection of a woman's right to access
emergency contraception by amending the current conscience statute by limiting its
scope to only abortion and/or sterilization procedures. Part I of this Comment
begins with a brief history of federal and state conscience legislation in the United
17. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-214 (LexisNexis 2009).
18. Id.
19. On average, approximately 131,950 women per year became victims of rape in the United
States between 1992 and 2000. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUB. NO. NCJ
194530, RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT: REPORTING TO POLICE AND MEDICAL ATrENTION, 1992-2000, at
I tbl.1 (2002), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/rsarp00.pdf. In 2005, Maryland
women fell victim to 1266 reported rapes. Md. Fam. Health Admin., Maryland Rape and Sexual
Assault, http://fha.maryland.gov/ohpetup/rsapp-scope.cfm (last visited Feb. 25, 2010). "One out of
every eight adult women.., in Maryland[] has been the victim of forcible rape sometime in her lifetime
. ... Id.
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States 20 and continues with a discussion of patient and provider rights in the context
of relevant constitutional interpretations and physician responsibilities grounded in
principles of medical ethics and Maryland case law.2' Part II provides a summary
of general scholarly discourse on the conflict between patient and provider rights.22
Part III argues that Maryland's conscience legislation must be amended in three
fundamental ways in order to prevent health care providers from being able to deny
care to women in need of emergency contraception.23 Specifically, the Maryland
legislature should (1) replace the phrase termination of pregnancy with abortion,24
(2) include a requirement that providers inform patients about emergency
contraception as a treatment option if it is medically indicated,25 and (3) require a
treating provider to either administer emergency contraception or to refer the
patient to another provider who is willing to provide emergency contraception
within the medically indicated time limit.
26
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF FEDERAL AND STATE CONSCIENCE CLAUSES
A. Federal Conscience Legislation
In the 1970s, Congress passed the first piece in a series of federal legislation
aimed at protecting a health care provider's choice to refuse treatment because of
conscience objections.27 The first federal conscience legislation came as a
countermeasure to the Supreme Court's holding in the 1973 decision of Roe v.
Wade.2 8 In Roe, the Court held that a woman possesses an individual right to bodily
privacy, which includes the decision about whether to have an abortion. 29 To
counter the effects of the Roe decision, Congress passed the Church Amendment3 °
20. See infra Part I.A-B.
21. See infra Part I.C-D.
22. See infra Part 11.
23. See infra Part IlI.
24. See infra notes 214-16 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 217-18 and accompanying text.
26. See infra pp. 197-98.
27. Brittany L. Grimes, The Plan Bfor Plan B: The New Dual Over-the-Counter and Prescription
Status of Plan B and Its Impact upon Pharmacists, Consumers, and Conscience Clauses, 41 GA. L. REV.
1395, 1401 (2007); see infra notes 30-60 and accompanying text (describing conscience legislation
considered by Congress since the 1970s and judicial interpretations of those laws).
28. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Jessica D. Yoder, Note, Pharmacists' Right of Conscience: Strategies for
Showing Respect for Pharmacists' Beliefs While Maintaining Adequate Care for Patients, 41 VAL. U. L.
REV. 975, 981 (2006).
29. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
30. Health Programs Extension Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-45, § 401, 87 Stat. 91, 95-96 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); JODY FEDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS REPORT
FOR CONGRESS: THE HISTORY AND EFFECT OF ABORTION CONSCIENCE CLAUSE LAwS 2 (2005),
available at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshalll/rsreports/crsdocuments/RS2142801142005.pdf,
see also Mary K. Collins, Conscience Clauses and Oral Contraceptives: Conscientious Objection or
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as part of the Health Programs Extension Act of 1973 .3 The amendment protected
individual providers from "perform[ing] or assist[ing] in the performance of any
sterilization procedure or abortion if his performance or assistance in the
performance of such procedure or abortion would be contrary to his religious
beliefs or moral convictions .... ,32 The Church Amendment restrictions apply to
all recipients of funds 33 under the Public Health Service (PHS) Act,34 the
Community Mental Health Centers Act,35 and the Developmental Disabilities
Services and Facilities Construction Act.36
Beginning in 1996, Congress passed a series of legislative protections that
expanded the scope of the original shield afforded to providers under the Church
Amendment. Following the Church Amendment, the next major piece of
conscience legislation 37 was included in the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and
Appropriations Act of 1996 (OBRA), 31 which amended the PHS Act.39 The OBRA
statute went beyond the provisions of the Church Amendment, as it prohibited
discrimination against health care providers who refuse to provide abortion services
and training for any reason and not just based on moral or religious grounds.4 °
Section 238n of the amended PHS Act also prohibits the federal government and
any state or local government receiving federal funds from discriminating against
an entity that refuses to provide arrangements and train for, undergo training for, or
refer for abortions. 4' In 1997, Congress shifted the focus of conscience legislation
Calculated Obstruction?, 15 ANNALS HEALTH L. 37, 47-48 (2006) (describing the Church
Amendment); Grimes, supra note 27, at 1401 (discussing post-Roe legislation).
31. § 401, 87 Stat. at 95-96.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b)(1) (2006).
33. Id. § 300a-7(b).
34. Public Health Service Act, Pub. L. No. 78-410, ch. 373, 58 Stat. 682 (1944) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 201-300ii-4 (2006 & Supp. 2009).
35. Mental Retardation Facilities and Community Mental Health Centers Construction Act of 1963,
Pub. L. No. 88-164, 77 Stat. 282, repealed by Pub. L. No. 94-103, § 302(c), 89 Stat. 486, 507 (1975),
and Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 902(e)(2)(B), 95 Stat. 357, 560 (1981).
36. Developmental Disabilities Services and Facilities Construction Amendments of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-517, 84 Stat. 1316 (1970), repealed by Pub. L. No. 106-402, § 401(a), 114 Stat. 1677, 1737
(2000). The act also prohibits entities receiving grants from the named appropriations legislation from
discriminating against applicants for training or study because of the applicant's reluctance or
willingness to participate in the performance of abortions or sterilizations contrary to or consistent with
the applicant's religious or moral beliefs. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(e) (2006).
37. FEDER, supra note 30, at 2. There was a lull in legislation passed by Congress after the Church
Amendment, with the exception of the adoption of the Danforth Amendment in 1988, which required
neutrality in the case of abortion. Id.
38. Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 515, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-245 to -246 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 238n).
39. FEDER, supra note 30, at 2.
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 238n(a); FEDER, supra note 30, at 4.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 238n(a). The amendment also prohibits the federal government or state or local
governments receiving federal assistance, from denying an entity accreditation or licensing, or from
denying the entity financial assistance, services or benefits because the entity relies on accreditation
20101
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from protecting the beliefs of individuals and institutional providers to protecting
the refusal rights of managed care providers funded by Medicaid and Medicare.42
This legislation was more expansive than previous federal conscience clause
statutes that allowed providers to refuse the actual performance of abortion services
because it allowed managed care providers to opt-out of counseling and referral
services as well.43
Since 1997 Congress has considered more expansive proposals for conscience
protection,44 but has only passed these expansions as part of appropriations
legislation and not as independent law.45 In 2003, legislators introduced two
companion bills in the House and Senate "[t]o prohibit certain abortion-related
discrimination in government activities.' ' 6 Neither of these bills went beyond
referral to committee,47 but both proposed to amend the PHS Act further by
expanding the definition of "health care entity" to include "other health
professional[s]," such as "hospital[s].... provider sponsored organization[s] ....
health maintenance organization[s], . . . health insurance plan[s], or any other kind
of health care facility, organization or plan. '48 To circumvent opposition to these
bills, supporters of the expansion inserted a conscience clause provision in the
standards that require the entity to perform, refer for, provide for or refer for training for abortions. Id.
§ 238n(b)(l). This statute extends protection to "individual physician[s]. . . . postgraduate physician
training programs, and . . . participant[s] in a program of training in the health professions." Id.
§ 238n(c)(2).
42. Just one year after the amendment to the PHS Act, Congress enacted the Balanced Budget Act
of 1997. Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997); FEDER, supra note 30, at 3. Congress enacted the
legislation because of concerns that managed care providers would attempt to prevent doctors from
informing patients about services not covered under their health plans. FEDER, supra note 30, at 3.
Although the statute prohibited Medicare, 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-22(j)(3)(A), and Medicaid, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396u-2(b)(3)(A), from preventing health care providers from discussing treatment options not
covered by the plans, the legislation also allowed the managed care providers to refuse to cover costs
associated with any service that the managed care provider is opposed to for moral or religious reasons.
Id. § 1395w-220)(3)(B) (Medicare); id. § 1396u-2(b)(3)(B) (Medicaid). These services could include
performing abortions, as well as providing abortion counseling and referrals. FEDER, supra note 30, at 3.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-22(j)(3)(B)(i) (Medicare); id. § 1396u-2(b)(3)(B)(i) (Medicaid); see also
FEDER, supra note 30, at 3 (noting that the 1997 legislation may have a broader effect than the Church
Amendment).
44. See infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
46. Abortion Non-Discrimination Act of 2003, H.R. 3664, 108th Cong. (2003); Abortion Non-
Discrimination Act of 2003, S. 1397, 108th Cong. (2003).
47. H.R. 3664 was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce on December 8, 2003. 149
CONG. REC. H12,917, H12,917-18 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 2003). S. 1397 was referred to the Committee on
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions on July 14, 2003. 149 CONG. REC. S9328, S9328 (daily ed. July
14, 2003).
48. H.R. 3664 § 2(3); S. 1397 § 2(3); see also FEDER, supra note 30, at 4 (discussing the
conscience clause provisions in H.R. 3664, S. 1397, and other legislation).
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Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005 called the Weldon Amendment. 49 The
Weldon Amendment successfully changed the definition of "health care entity" to
the more expansive definition proposed by the failed companion bills and expanded
the entities restricted by the legislation to include all recipients who receive funding
from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), as well as the
Departments of Labor and Education. 50 Relative to previous laws, this legislation
greatly expanded the list of entities protected under a conscience exception.5 ' Since
the 2005 Weldon Amendment, Congress has inserted a conscience clause in every
subsequent year's HHS appropriations act.52
In 1997 the Supreme Court sparked significant implications for provider
rights under state conscience legislation by striking down the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA) 53 in City of Boerne v. Flores.54 In 1993, Congress had
passed the RFRA, which prohibited the government from burdening religion with a
law of general applicability unless the government could demonstrate such a
burden was in furtherance of a compelling government interest and was the least
restrictive means to further it. 5 The RFRA was enacted in order to make the
compelling interest test, previously established in Sherbert v. Verner,56 the
controlling test for cases where free exercise of religion is burdened by a statute.57
In City of Boerne, the Court struck down the RFRA because its enactment
exceeded Congress' enforcement power, and because the statute created
"considerable congressional intrusion into the States' traditional prerogatives and
general authority to regulate for the health and welfare of citizens. 58 In so doing,
49. Pub. L. No. 108-447, § 508(d), 118 Stat. 2809, 3163 (2004); see also Ensuring that Department
of Health and Human Services Funds Do Not Support Coercive or Discriminatory Policies or Practices
in Violation of Federal Law, 73 Fed. Reg. 50,274, 50,276 (proposed Aug. 26, 2008) (discussing the
Weldon Amendment).
50. Id. § 508(d); see FEDER, supra note 30, at 4-5 (discussing the Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2005).
51. Compare § 508(d), with 42 U.S.C. §§ 300a-7(b), 1395w-22(j)(3)(B) (2006), and §§ 238n(c)(2),
1396u-2(b)(3)(B) (2006 & West Supp. 2009).
52. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, § 508(d), 121 Stat. 1844, 2209
(2007); Revised Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-5, sec. 2, § 105, 121 Stat.
8, 9; Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-149, § 508(d), 119 Stat. 2833, 2879-80; see also Ensuring
that Department of Health and Human Services Funds Do Not Support Coercive or Discriminatory
Policies or Practices in Violation of Federal Law, 73 Fed. Reg. at 50,276.
53. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4.
54. 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.
56. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). In Verner, the Court found that the state had failed to assert a compelling
interest that would justify denying unemployment benefits to a Jewish person who refused to work on
the Sabbath. Id. at 408-10.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b).
58. City ofBoerne, 521 U.S. at 534.
2010]
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the Court reinstated its previous holding from Employment Division v. Smith,59
where the Court declined to apply the Sherbert balancing test to a law of general
applicability. 60 Based on the Court's ruling in City of Boerne, it seems as though
RFRA no longer stands as an obstacle in the way of states passing laws of general
applicability, even if those laws indirectly burden religion. Thus, state legislation
that guarantees access to types of care, but also may indirectly burden the religious
beliefs of a provider through application, may still be constitutional, even without
demonstrating a compelling government interest for the legislation.
B. State Conscience Legislation
Following in the footsteps of the federal government, states have also
independently passed legislative conscience protections. As of February 1, 2010,
almost every state had adopted a policy allowing health care providers to refuse to
provide or participate in abortions, contraceptive services, or sterilizations. 61 State
conscience protections range in coverage over the types of health care entities
protected and the types of health care services exempted.62 Some of the least
expansive conscience protections can be found in Connecticut, New York, and
West Virginia.63 In Connecticut and New York, the only protections afforded to
health care providers apply to individual providers, and neither state provides a
refusal protection for institutions or pharmacies. 64 Furthermore, individual
providers in Connecticut and New York may only refuse to provide abortions. 65
West Virginia's statute is also considerably narrow, providing no refusal
59. 494 U.S. 872, 884-85, 890 (1990) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment did not prohibit application of Oregon's drug laws to the ceremonial ingestion of peyote).
In Employment Division, citizens were dismissed from jobs because of their illegal ingestion of peyote,
which they used for sacramental purposes. Id. at 874. They were also denied unemployment benefits
because they were discharged for work-related misconduct. Id.
60. Id. at 884-85. A law of general applicability does not specifically target religion but its non-
religious application could indirectly burden religion. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 535 (majority
opinion) (discussing the impact of laws of general applicability on the practice of religion); id. at 537-39
(Scalia, J., concurring in part) (same).
61. See GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: REFUSING TO PROVIDE HEALTH SERVICES
1 (2010), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spibRPHS.pdf (indicating that
forty-six states allow some providers to refuse to provide abortions, thirteen allow some providers to
refuse to provide services related to contraception, and seventeen allow some providers to refuse to
provide sterilization services).
62. See id. at 2 (presenting data on abortion, contraception and sterilization, and on individual
providers, institutions, pharmacies and pharmacists). For additional details, see infra note 227 and
accompanying table.
63. See GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 61, at 2. Some other states with relatively narrow
conscience statutes include Iowa, Michigan, and Nebraska; each of these states has enacted statutes that
only allow providers to refuse abortion services. Id.
64. See, e.g., N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAW § 79-i (McKinney 2009); GUTrMACHER INST., supra note 61,
at 2.
65. GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 61, at 2.
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allowances for abortion or contraception, but permitting individual and institutional
providers to refuse to provide or participate in sterilization procedures.
66
Some of the most expansive coverage for health care providers can be found
in states like Mississippi and Arkansas. In Mississippi, both individual and
institutional providers, including public and private entities, have the right to refuse
to provide or participate in abortions, contraception, and sterilization procedures.67
Mississippi's statute also explicitly provides protection to pharmacies and
pharmacists. 68 Arkansas is almost as expansive, except that it contains a broadly-
worded refusal clause that may apply to pharmacies in allowing them to refuse to
dispense contraception, but does not explicitly exempt pharmacies. 69 Arkansas also
only allows private institutions to refuse to provide contraception. 70 Two other
states with relatively expansive conscience statutes are Colorado and Washington.
In Colorado, individual and institutional providers can refuse abortion services. 7!
An exception is also provided for contraception for individuals and private
institutions, and possibly pharmacists and pharmacies because of the broad wording
of the statute.72 In Washington, institutions and individuals can refuse to provide
abortion and sterilization services as well as contraception. 3
Although Maryland's conscience legislation also contains broad protections
for health care providers, the statutory language is not as expansive as the statutes
in states like Mississippi or Arkansas. 74 As amended in 1991,75 the Maryland
statute explicitly protects individual providers and hospitals that refuse to provide
or participate in the "termination of [a] pregnancy., 76 The statute also allows
individual providers and hospitals to refuse to provide or participate in artificial
66. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-1 (LexisNexis 2006); GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 61, at 2.
67. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-5(1) (2009) ("A health-care provider has the right not to participate,
and no health-care provider shall be required to participate in a health-care service that violates his or
her conscience.") (emphasis added); id. § 41-107-7(1) ("A health-care institution has the right not to
participate, and no health-care institution shall be required to participate in a health-care service that
violates its conscience.") (emphasis added).
68. See id. § 41-107-3(b) (including pharmacists and pharmacy employees in the definition of
health care providers).
69. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-304(4) (2005) (exempting physicians, pharmacists, and other
health care providers, but not expressly including pharmacies).
70. id. § 20-16-304(5).
71. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-6-102(7), (9) (West 2008 & Supp. 2009).
72. Id.
73. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 70.47.160(2)(e), 9.02.150 (West 2009).
74. Unlike the conscience statutes in Mississippi and Arkansas, Maryland's conscience statute does
not permit a health care provider to refuse to offer contraception. Compare MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-5
(2009), and ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-304(4), with MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-214 (2009).
Maryland's statute also does not contain a specific provision protecting pharmacists from refusing to
dispense contraception. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-214.
75. 1991 Md. Laws, ch. 1.
76. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-214(aHb).
2010]
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insemination or sterilization procedures.77 Because of its abortion and sterilization
policies, and since the statute does not explicitly discuss a provider's refusal rights
regarding contraception, 8 the Maryland statute could be classified as more neutral
along the spectrum of state conscience statutes. However, because the statute does
not mention emergency contraception specifically, 79 its ambiguity opens the door
for inconsistent provider interpretation. 80 Thus, Maryland's statute, despite its
seemingly passive stance, 8' could result in a broader application when it comes to
emergency contraception. Part III of this Comment contains a discussion on the
potential effects of ambiguities in Maryland's conscience statute and
recommendations for legislative reform.
82
C. Constitutional Interpretations of Patient Rights
The debate over legislative conscience protections should begin with a
discussion about the scope of a provider's right to refuse to supply services relative
to the scope of a patient's right to access specific treatments. Provider and patient
rights have been explored in the context of constitutional rights to privacy 83 and
free exercise. 84 Although this Comment does not attempt to achieve the proper
balance between these opposing interests, a discussion about the Court's
interpretations of patient and provider rights is important in order to understand this
Comment's conclusions about changes to Maryland's conscience statute.
In 1965 the Supreme Court confirmed a constitutional right to privacy in
Griswold v. Connecticut.85 In Griswold, health care providers in Connecticut
appealed their conviction as accessories for providing married couples with
contraceptive advice and treatment.86 The trial court convicted them as accessories




80. Some providers define emergency contraception as a treatment that terminates a pregnancy,
and thus would include emergency contraception as a service they have a right to refuse under the
statute. Yoder, supra note 28, at 977 ("Emergency contraception may or may not cause an abortion,
depending on a person's judgment as to when life begins.").
81. Maryland's conscience statute could be considered to take a passive stance on a physician's
right to refuse to dispense emergency contraception because it does not explicitly include emergency
contraception as a service a provider can refuse, but also does not require a provider to dispense
emergency contraception. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-214(a)-(b).
82. See infra Part Il1.
83. E.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992) (abortion); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965)
(contraception).
84. E.g., City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533-34 (1997); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
85. 381 U.S. at 486.
86. Id. at 480.
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or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception .... The Supreme Court
reviewed the Appellant providers' constitutional challenge to the statute's
prohibition against contraceptive use and concluded that an individual's right to
privacy, although not explicitly named, is included in the First Amendment's
"penumbra" of protections.88 Additionally, the Court found that a law forbidding
access to contraception would "invade the area of protected freedoms" under the
Constitution.89 In Eisenstadt v. Baird,90 the Court expanded a right to access
contraception free from governmental intrusion to all women, not just to married
couples.91 Thus, under the Supreme Court's holdings in Griswold and Eisenstadt, a
statute that forbids access to contraception violates a woman's constitutional right
to privacy.
In 1973 the Court strengthened and extended an individual's right to bodily
privacy as a guarantee of substantive due process in the case of Roe v. Wade.92
Based on a line of precedents,93 the Court concluded that personal privacy is a
"findamental" right,94 which includes the right to access abortion.95 Limiting this
right somewhat, the Court stated that regulation over "fundamental rights" may
only be justified by a "compelling state interest., 96 Thus a state cannot limit a
87. Id. The medical providers convicted in Griswold were directly convicted under a second statute
that punished "[a]ny person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires or commands another to commit
any offense .... Id.
88. Id. at 483. More "peripheral" rights of the First Amendment include "[tihe right to educate
[one's] child in a school of the parents' choice . . . [,] the right to study ... any foreign language" in
school, and the right to associate with other people. Id. at 482.
89. Id. at 485.
90. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
91. Id. at 453.
92. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Appellants brought the action in this case for an injunctive relief from
a Texas abortion law that the Appellants claimed was unconstitutional. Id. at 117-18. The Court held
that the Texas statute, which prohibited abortions at all stages of pregnancy except to save the life of the
mother, was unconstitutional. Id. at 164. The Court also created three distinct time periods during which
the appropriateness of state regulation of a mother's abortion decision was determined. Id. at 164-65.
The decision to continue the pregnancy would be left to the mother and mother's physician during the
first trimester. Id. at 164. After the first trimester and until viability of the unborn child, the state could
regulate abortion procedures related to the mother's health. Id. Finally, after the point of viability, the
state may proscribe abortion, except in cases where medically appropriate in order to preserve the life or
health of the mother. Id. at 164-65.
93. Id. at 152-53 (citing, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965), and
Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453-54).
94. Id. at 152-55 (citing, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), and Eisenstadt, 405
U.S. at 453-54).
95. Id. at 153 ("Th[e] right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's
concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action ...or ...in the Ninth Amendment's
reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy.").
96. Id. at 155 (citing, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969), Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969), and Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963)).
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woman's right to privacy without a compelling government interest in doing so. In
the context of patient and provider rights, this limitation is compounded by the
Court's holding in Boerne, which reaffirmed a state's right to enact religion-neutral
laws that indirectly burden religion without a compelling state interest. 97 Based on
the Roe9 and Boerne99 holdings, patient rights seem to be favored by the Court for
state statutory protection.
In 1992 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Roe decision in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.00 The Court unequivocally
upheld the core holding in Roe, stating that "[n]o evolution of legal principle has
left Roe's doctrinal footings weaker than they were in 1973"101 While maintaining
the constitutional right established in Roe, the Planned Parenthood Court replaced
the "compelling state interest" test with the "undue burden standard."'10 2 The new
standard prohibits state regulation of a woman's right to an abortion that "has the
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking
an abortion .... 0 3
D. Professional Responsibilities Grounded in Medical Ethics and
Maryland Case Law
Patient and provider rights have also been explored in the context of
established principles of medical ethics. According to the American Medical
Association's (AMA) Principles of Medical Ethics, patients must give informed
consent before a provider can begin treatment. 0 4 The AMA describes informed
consent as "more than simply getting a patient to sign a written consent form."
10 5
Informed consent "is a process of communication between a patient and physician
that results in the patient's authorization or agreement to undergo a specific medical
97. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533-34 (1997).
98. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-67.
99. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536.
100. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
101. Id. at 857. The Court went on to say that "[n]o development of constitutional law since the case
was decided has implicitly or explicitly left Roe behind as a mere survivor of obsolete constitutional
thinking." Id.
102. Id. at 876.
103. Id. at 877. The Court elaborated further by stating that a law designed to further the state's
interest in protecting a fetal life that imposes an undue burden on the woman's decision would be
unconstitutional. Id.
104. AM. MED. Ass'N, HEALTH AND ETHICS POLICIES OF THE AMA HouSE OF DELEGATES 585
(n.d.), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ad-com/polfind/Hlth-Ethics.pdf ("The patient's right of
self-decision can be effectively exercised only if the patient possesses enough information to enable an
informed choice.").
105. Am. Med. Ass'n, Patient Physician Relationship Topics: Informed Consent, http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/legal-topics/patient-physician-relationship-topics/informed-
consent.shtml (last visited Feb. 25, 2010).
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intervention. 1 °6 According to the AMA, in order to achieve informed consent,
physicians should disclose alternative treatments and the risks and benefits to the
alternatives.10 7 Thus, statutory and constitutional requirements aside, physicians
have an affirmative ethical obligation to inform a patient of all possible treatment
alternatives available, including those that the physician may not personally believe
are in the patient's best interest or that the physician does not personally support.10
Physicians also have an ethical duty to refer patients to another provider if doing so
would be in the best interest of a patient.'0 9 As a viable treatment to preventing an
unwanted pregnancy,"0 emergency contraception counts as a treatment option that
a physician has an ethical obligation to discuss with a patient facing a potential
pregnancy.
Maryland courts have adopted a reasonableness standard, rather than the
professional medical standard, for obtaining informed consent, and thus require full
disclosure of alternative treatments in order for a physician to obtain a patient's
informed consent. The landmark case on informed consent is the decision of the
Maryland Court of Appeals in Sard v. Hardy."' One of the central issues in the
case was whether the physician violated the doctrine of informed consent when he
failed to disclose alternative treatment options to the patient."12 The court
106. Id.
107. Id. Patients should also be given "an opportunity to ask questions to elicit a better
understanding of the treatment or procedure, so that he or she can make an informed decision to proceed
or to refuse a particular course of medical intervention." Id.
108. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. & BIOMEDICAL &
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP 76 (1982), available at
http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/past-commissions/making-health care-decisions.pdf ("Since the
judgment about which choice will best serve well-being properly belongs to the patient, a physician is
obliged to mention all alternative treatments, including those he or she does not provide or favor, so long
as they are supported by respectable medical opinion."); Am. Med. Ass'n, supra note 105; see also
Rachel Benson Gold, Conscience Makes a Comeback in the Age of Managed Care, GUTTMACHER REP.,
Feb. 1998, at 1, 2, http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/Ol/l/grOlOlOl.pdf (discussing private health
plans and the "incompatib[ility] with ... basic [medical] principles" of such plans that "gag physicians
from discussing a woman's options on the grounds of corporate conscience").
109. AM. MED. ASS'N, supra note 104, at 591 ("Physicians should always make referral decisions
based on the best interests of their patients .... ).
110. Sarah Tomkowiak, Reconciling Principles and Prescriptions: Do Pharmacist Refusal Clauses
Strike the Appropriate Balance Between Pharmacists'and Patients'Rights?, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 1329,
1335 ("[Emergency contraception] reduces a woman's chance of experiencing an unintended pregnancy
by up to eighty-nine percent. It is estimated that the use of [emergency contraception] could prevent
approximately 1.7 million unintended pregnancies and eight hundred thousand abortions each year.").
111. 379 A.2d 1014 (1977). A patient and her husband accused the treating physician of negligently
performing a bilateral tubal ligation on the patient, and of failing to disclose the fail-rates of the
operation as well as alternative options for treatment. Id. at 1017. In failing to disclose this information,
the plaintiffs alleged, the physician had failed to obtain the patient's informed consent for the
sterilization surgery. Id. After undergoing the sterilization procedure, the patient became pregnant
despite believing that she was sterile. Id. at 1019.
112. Id. at 1017.
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recognized the doctrine to mean "that a physician, treating a mentally competent
adult under non-emergency circumstances, cannot properly undertake to perform
surgery or administer other therapy without the prior consent of his patient."' 1 3 In
applying the doctrine, the court stated that "unless a person has been adequately
apprised of the material risks and therapeutic alternatives incident to a proposed
treatment, any consent given, be it oral or written, is necessarily ineffectual." ' 1 4 The
court affirmatively adopted a "general or lay standard of reasonableness set by law
and independent of medical custom," 1 5 over the professional standard of care set
by medical custom. 116 The reasonableness standard requires the physician to
disclose any information the patient requires in order to make an "intelligent
decision" about treatment. 17 Thus, "the scope of the physician's duty to inform is
to be measured by the materiality of the information to the decision of the
patient."'" 8 Under the reasonableness standard adopted by Maryland's highest
court, a physician should be required to disclose emergency contraception as a
treatment option to emergency room patients who are at risk of becoming pregnant
in order to legally receive informed consent for treatment.
II. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN PATIENT AND PROVIDER RIGHTS
Many scholars have addressed the difficult issue of where to the draw the line
between a patient's right to access and a provider's right to refuse treatment for
moral or religious reasons. The extent of patient and provider rights in the context
of state regulation is a difficult question to answer because medical services fall
into an intermediate category between secular and sectarian activity." 9 Religious
113. Id. at 1019. Additionally, the reference to "non-emergency situations" is likely referring to
cases where a physician need not act with haste to save a patient's life or avoid further injury to the
patient. See id. at 1022 (referencing exceptions to a physician's duty to obtain informed consent when
"an emergency of such gravity and urgency exists that it is impractical to obtain the patient's consent").
114. Id. at 1019 n.3. The court went on to affirm that a physician's duty to disclose includes
disclosure of alternative treatment options, id. at 1020, and that "[tihe law does not allow a physician to
substitute his judgment for that of the patient in the matter of consent to treatment." Id.
115. Id. at 1021-22.
116. Id. at 1022.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Kathleen M. Boozang, Deciding the Fate of Religious Hospitals in the Emerging Health Care
Market, 31 Hous. L. REv. 1429, 1477-78 (1995). Medical services fall under an intermediate category
of activity that is not completely secular, but not purely spiritual. Id. Whether the state considers
sectarian health care services as activity within the practice of religion is important because such a
perception would make that activity subject to certain exemptions from civil laws. See id. at 1476
(noting the possibility that states may view sectarian health care as part of the practice of religion).
Purely secular activities are subject to the regulation of the state and purely religious activities are
exempt from laws that interfere with the religious institution's religious beliefs. Id. at 1477. However
those activities that fall into the intermediate category create an ambiguity as far as regulation. Id. For a
discussion of the Supreme Court's interpretations of medical services as an intermediate category of
activity that the state may regulate, see id. at 1475-80.
[VOL. 13:171
MARYLAND'S CONSCIENCE CLAUSE
providers have used constitutional guarantees as well as federal and state
conscience legislation to support their right to refuse certain treatments. 120 As
discussed above, patient rights have also been confirmed and protected under
constitutional guarantees. 12 However, state conscience legislation varies greatly
from state to state, and thus patient and provider protections are not consistently
applied throughout the country. 2 2 Many commentators have asserted other
arguments about how conscience conflicts could be improved through state
legislative reform.' 23 These assertions apply to many of the health care spheres
touched by the issue of conscience protections, including religious institutions,
pharmacies, and contraception in general. 24 All of these arguments ultimately
attempt to outline the proper balance between patient and provider rights.' 
25
Religious institutions are one sphere of the health care industry touched by
the issue of conscience protections. There is a tension between patients seeking
specific health care services and institutional health care providers that refuse to
provide such services on religious or moral grounds. 26 Kathleen Boozang,
Professor of Law at Seton Hall University School of Law, addressed this tension
and raised the question of "whether federal and state laws should continue to
protect a hospital's ability to establish institutional policies according to its
religious or moral beliefs.' 27 Boozang asserted that legislatures should institute
reforms "that offer[] both protection to the sectarian health care provider and
ensure[] patient access to care.,, 12s Boozang proposed that legislatures should
provide access to services through alternative secular providers or require sectarian
institutions to provide unrestricted access to legally guaranteed treatment.
129
Alternatively, Boozang also suggested that "legislatures might institute innovative
market reforms by encouraging cooperative delivery arrangements between secular
and sectarian providers .... 130
120. Id. at 1480.
121. See supra Part I.C.
122. See supra Part 1.B (discussing variances in state conscience legislation).
123. See infra notes 127-54 and accompanying text.
124. Many scholars have proposed reforms to conscience protections regarding religious institutions,
pharmacies and pharmacists, and contraception itself. See, e.g., Boozang, supra note 119 (religious
institutions); Grimes, supra note 27 (pharmacies and pharmacists); Tomkowiak, supra note 110
(contraception).
125. This Comment asserts that one state in particular, Maryland, should amend its current
conscience legislation in order to provide stronger protections for women seeking access to emergency
contraception in emergency rooms. See infra Part Ill.
126. Boozang, supra note 119, at 1430-3 1.
127. Id. at 1438.
128. Id. at 1493.
129. Id. at 1431.
130. Id. at 1438-39.
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Boozang's argument requires state legislative action in order to achieve a
proper balance between provider and patient rights. This proposed resolution would
allow religious institutions to maintain loyalty to their beliefs but would also allow
patients to receive the type of care to which they are entitled. 31 In order to achieve
the proper balance, Boozang's argument places the burden on policy makers to
create an inventive solution through legislation.
132
Other commentators have specifically focused on the need for state legislative
reform in order to ease the tension between customers seeking access to
contraceptive treatment and pharmacists refusing to provide access. At least one
argument asserts that state statutes lacking a clear indication of a pharmacist's exact
refusal rights are particularly problematic when it comes to a woman's right to
access a popular form of emergency contraception, Plan B. 33 In 2006 the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) approved over-the-counter access for women age 18
and over,' 34 and then lowered the age to 17 in 2009.135 One commentator asserted
that the "dual status" of emergency contraception as a prescription and over-the
counter drug is cause for state legislatures to adopt reforms to conscience
statutes. 136 This argument asserts that, without statutory clarification, the FDA's
131. Id. at 1515-16.
132. Id. at 1516. Boozang advocates for a cooperative effort between the state, non-sectarian health
care providers, and sectarian health care providers to create a solution that will provide patients with
access to a complete range of services, and also protect the beliefs of religious facilities. Id.
133. See Grimes, supra note 27, at 1419-21 (focusing on the problematic nature of ambiguous
statutes given the new "dual status" of Plan B). Plan B is a type of emergency contraception that, if
taken orally within seventy-two hours of intercourse, can prevent a future pregnancy. Duramed Pharm.,
Inc., Plan B One-Step Customer: What Is Plan B One-Step?, http://www.go2planb.com/plan-b.aspx (last
visited Feb. 25, 2010).
134. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Approves Over-the-Counter Access for Plan B
for Women 18 and Older: Prescription Remains Required for Those 17 and Under (Aug. 24, 2006),
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2006/ucm 108717.htm.
135. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Updated FDA Action on Plan B (Levonorgestrel)
Tablets (Apr. 22, 2009), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/
ucm149568.htm.
136. Grimes, supra note 27, at 1421. The same argument that emergency contraception's dual status
creates a need for statutory reform also includes the assertion that state statutes that were ambiguous
before the dual status change have become even more problematic after the policy change. Some states
with narrow statutes that are particularly ambiguous, like Georgia's, GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-142(b)
(2007), could actually be construed to give broader protections to pharmacists because of the change to
dual status. Grimes, supra note 27, at 1420. Mississippi's statute, on the other hand, is broad enough to
protect pharmacists from having to dispense to both underage women with a prescription and of-age
women without a prescription. Id. at 1419. The language in the Mississippi statute that describes a
pharmacist's right includes "prescribing, dispensing or administering .... " MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-
3(a) (2009). Before the FDA policy change, Georgia's general conscience statute was too narrow to
protect pharmacists from refusing to dispense emergency contraception on moral or religious grounds.
Grimes, supra note 27, at 1420. However, Georgia's statute contains a clause that states that "[n]othing
in this subsection shall be construed to authorize a pharmacist to refuse to fill a prescription for birth
control medication .... " GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-142(b) (emphasis added). Since the policy change
allows some customers to request emergency contraception with a prescription and some without a
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change in policy will create complications for delivery of emergency
contraception. 37 Although the change in federal regulation applies to pharmacists
and not to emergency rooms, the argument for clearer state legislation to remedy
federal ambiguities for pharmacists is parallel to the argument that states should
clarify conscience statutes that govern how emergency contraception is dispensed
in emergency rooms.
Another interpretation advocates for legislative changes that would protect the
rights of pharmacists from dispensing emergency contraception because some may
believe emergency contraception causes an abortion. 38 This interpretation contains
the assertion that specific statutory protections are essential, but that these
protections are necessary primarily for the protection of pharmacist beliefs. 139 The
argument hinges on the assumption that the use of emergency contraception results
in an abortion, and not merely the prevention of a pregnancy.140 The argument also
relies on the fact that the Supreme Court has determined that a woman's right to an
abortion does not include a government duty to make abortions more accessible' 4 1
and that governments have "generally [not] been required to subsidize the exercise
of fundamental rights .... 14' Thus, this argument concludes that a refusal to
provide emergency contraception is not a violation of a patient's constitutional
rights. 43 Countering this argument is the interpretation that patients have a
constitutional right to access emergency contraception. 1
44
The argument for stronger provider protections also relies on the premise that
the use of emergency contraception constitutes an abortion, despite the fact that this
prescription, the statute's language could be construed as implicitly allowing a pharmacist to refuse to
dispense emergency contraception to customers without a prescription. Grimes, supra note 27 at 1420.
Thus the argument asserts that states with ambiguities that do not properly clarify a pharmacist's refusal
for emergency contraception, particularly given the FDA policy change for Plan B, must reform their
conscience legislation to prevent the difficulties associated with the ambiguity. Id. at 1421.
137. The kinds of complications asserted by this argument were in reference to when the dual status
hinged on age 18, id. at 1417, but are equally as applicable now that the age has been lowered to 17.
Some of these complications include enforcement difficulties and a barrier to popular support of the
FDA's mandated change to dual status. Id. Since the availability of Plan B is not necessarily known by
all customers who may need access, many under-age women seeking the pill will likely feel
embarrassed and confused after they learn at the pharmacy that they are unable to get Plan B without a
prescription. Id. Enforcement problems could occur since older friends and boyfriends of underage
women would be willing to help younger women gain access without a prescription. Id.
138. See, e.g., Yoder, supra note 28, at 975 (describing one pharmacist's view that life begins at
conception, and his reluctance to dispense emergency contraceptives).
139. Id. at 1025.
140. See id. at 975.
141. See id. at 983 (citing Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 445-46 (1977)).
142. Id. at 988: see, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 466 (1977) (holding that a state regulation that
limited Medicaid benefits to medically necessary, first trimester abortions did not impinge a woman's
fundamental right).
143. Yoder, supra note 28, at 1003.
144. See supra Part I.C.
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conclusion is not accepted by the medical community 45 or constitutional
precedent. As explained above, the Supreme Court has consistently held that
women have the right to make their own family planning decisions. 146 Further,
there is no Supreme Court precedent on which to base a classification of emergency
contraception as an abortifacient. Even commentators in favor of stronger provider
protections acknowledge that the Court has never declared when life officially
begins and that a conclusion about emergency contraception as an abortifacient is
not substantiated by a Supreme Court opinion. 47 The same proponents for stronger
provider protections also acknowledge that the right to use contraception "appears
to be broader in scope than the right to abortion."' 148 While Griswold laid the
foundation for a right to bodily privacy, 149 Eisenstadt declared that individuals have
"the right... to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into.., the
decision whether to bear or beget a child."' 50 Part III of this Comment contains a
discussion on prevailing rights and the assertion that Maryland's state statute
should be reformed to guarantee patient rights to emergency contraception.'
5
'
Another argument suggests that state statutes permitting refusal of
contraception for pharmacists go beyond the original intent of refusal clauses.'
52
The original purpose of conscience legislation was to allow doctors and nurses who
actually performed abortions to refuse to perform these procedures if they had a
moral or religious objection. 5 3 Since a pharmacist's role is only to help patients
make use of their medications and not to directly select treatment for patients,
legislation that allows pharmacists to refuse to provide access to treatment runs
against the original purpose of conscience clauses. 154 This argument is equally
applicable to emergency room physicians who would be providing rape victims
access to oral emergency contraceptives.
1II. MARYLAND'S CONSCIENCE CLAUSE SHOULD BE AMENDED
IN THREE FUNDAMENTAL WAYS
A woman's access to emergency contraception in Maryland emergency rooms
is an important issue deserving the attention of Maryland legislators. For women,
145. See infra note 214.
146. See supra Part I.C.
147. Yoder, supra note 28, at 986.
148. Id. at 987.
149. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
150. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
151. See infra Part III.
152. Tomkowiak, supra note 110, at 1340.
153. Id. Although conscience clauses initially applied to abortions only, many states have expanded
their clauses to include other types of treatment such as assistive reproductive technology, human
embryonic or fetal research, in vitro fertilization, and stem cell research. Id. at 1339-40.
154. Id. at 1340.
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this issue is of particular importance because women bear the greatest burden if
rights to access are not protected. However, although women have the most to lose
from legislation lacking protections to access, the unique consequences of an
unplanned pregnancy, especially from rape or incest, will also greatly affect a
woman's family as well as the greater Maryland community. Justice Blackmun
described these unique consequences 15  in his explanation in Roe for why women
are guaranteed a constitutional right to privacy that includes the decision to
terminate a pregnancy. 56 Furthermore, Griswold and its progeny demonstrate the
Court's stance that a law forbidding a woman's access to contraception, and even
to abortion, would be an infringement on a woman's guaranteed right to privacy
and family planning.
157
Maryland's legislature should prohibit health care providers from denying
patients access to emergency contraception in hospital emergency rooms. Many
scholars have advocated for a balance between a provider's right to refuse services
that conflict with its religious doctrine and a patient's right to access those
services. 58 This Comment is in general agreement with those scholars who argue
that both provider and patient rights must be protected through legislative means.
This Comment asserts, however, that without explicit legislative protections that
guarantee access to emergency contraception, Maryland's conscience statute could
produce a state-sanctioned practical denial of access to emergency
contraception. 59 Thus, because of constitutional guarantees to privacy and the
155. Justice Blackmun stated:
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying th[e] choice
[to have an abortion] altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable
even in early pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon
the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and
physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned,
associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family
already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases, as in this one, the
additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved. All
these are factors the woman and her responsible physician necessarily will consider in
consultation.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
156. Id. at 153 ("This right of privacy . . . is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.").
157. See supra Part I.C.
158. See supra Part II.
159. Due to the time-sensitive nature of emergency contraception, an emergency room doctor's
refusal could result in three scenarios where a patient is unable to benefit from treatment because the
effectiveness period would have lapsed before they could find an alternative provider. See infra Part
III.A. These scenarios demonstrate a practical denial of access because a patient would not have another
opportunity to prevent a pending pregnancy after the effectiveness of emergency contraception expires.
Such a statute constitutes the kind of burdensome government obstacle and a form of government
intrusion that the Supreme Court has held to be unconstitutional. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) ("[An undue burden is an unconstitutional burden.").
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irreversible consequences that denied access can produce, Maryland's legislature
should reform the state conscience statute in three fundamental ways in order to
explicitly protect a woman's right to access emergency contraception in emergency
rooms in Maryland. The Maryland legislature should (1) replace the phrase
termination of pregnancy with abortion,160 (2) include a requirement that providers
inform patients about emergency contraception as a treatment option if it is
medically indicated,' 61 and (3) require a treating provider to either administer
emergency contraception, or to refer the patient to another provider who is willing
to provide emergency contraception within the medically indicated time limit.'
62
A. Maryland's Conscience Statute Is Problematically Ambiguous
Ambiguous state legislation that lacks affirmative guarantees of access to
emergency contraception will create the opportunity for a practical denial of access
because of the time-sensitive nature of emergency contraception. First, the
effectiveness of emergency contraception is limited by a very finite period of time
after intercourse has occurred. 163 Although emergency contraception can be
effective if taken within 120 hours of intercourse, it is most effective if taken within
the first twelve to twenty-four hours after intercourse,164 and should be taken within
seventy-two hours. 65 If taken after a fertilized egg has implanted into the uterine
wall, emergency contraception is entirely ineffective. 66 Thus, if a provider's
refusal makes it practically impossible for a patient to access emergency
contraception elsewhere in time for the treatment to be effective, the conscience
statute permitting this refusal will have effectively denied that patient access to
treatment altogether.
Two other scenarios that demonstrate how an emergency room physician's
refusal could result in a practical denial of access to treatment are when patients
live in rural or impoverished areas, and when a physician refuses to either inform a
patient about the treatment or refer a patient to another willing provider. In many
rural or impoverished areas, a patient may not have the resources to travel to
another physician or facility that does not share the same objections as the first
160. See infra notes 214-16 and accompanying text.
161. See infra notes 217-18 and accompanying text.
162. See infra pp. 197-98.
163. See generally Elizabeth Spahn & Barbara Andrade, Mis-Conceptions: The Moment of
Conception in Religion, Science, and Law, 32 U.S.F. L. REv. 261, 279-97 (1998) (discussing the
biological process of conception between the moment of intercourse and fertilization).
164. Tomkowiak, supra note 110, at 1336.
165. Duramed Pharm., Inc., Plan B One-Step Customer: Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.go2planb.com/plan-b-faq.aspx (last visited Feb. 25, 2010). Since the pharmaceutical
provider of emergency contraception recommends seventy-two hours as the effective usage period, this
Comment will assume seventy-two hours is the appropriate window for effective treatment with
emergency contraception.
166. Tomkowiak, supra note 110, at 1336.
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emergency room where the patient was denied. 67 In fact, protocol in many areas
requires that rape victims transported by emergency vehicles be taken to the closest
hospital available, regardless of ideological affiliation. 168 Thus, a rape victim
without the means to go elsewhere may not make it to another provider in time to
benefit from the effects of emergency contraception. Finally, ambiguous
legislation, which does not specifically require a provider to at least inform a
patient of emergency contraception as an existing treatment option, will likely
cause a practical denial of treatment. 169 If a patient is unfamiliar with emergency
contraception and a treating emergency room physician purposely neglects to
inform her, the ambiguous law will have practically denied that patient treatment if
she does not somehow learn about the option before the drug's effectiveness
expires. 170
All three of the practical denial scenarios are magnified in effect when the
patient is a victim of rape or incest and is taken to an emergency room for
treatment. 17' Rape victims can be confused, frightened, or in an incapacitated
state. 172 Victims of incestual rape are often young' 73 and may not be accompanied
by a guardian who is knowledgeable about emergency contraception. Both of these
typical candidates for emergency contraception may be lacking the resources,
social support, and knowledge of treatment options to be able to overcome a
practical denial of access to treatment that they have a right to receive. 174
Ambiguities in Maryland's conscience statute could cause the practical denial
of access to emergency contraception and would, therefore, violate a woman's
constitutional rights to such access. In Griswold, the Supreme Court stated that a
law forbidding access to contraception would be a violation of a woman's right to
167. Erdely, supra note I ("[Y]ou don't need to be in a rural area to have limited access,... all you
need to be is poor.").
168. Michael Hirsley, Bishop Reignites Ethics Struggle: Catholic Hospital Told to Deny Morning-
After Pill to Victims of Rape, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 25, 1994. Therefore, rape victims can be taken to the
emergency department of a hospital that refuses to administer emergency contraception. See id.
169. See supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text (discussing Lori Boyer's story and the potential
for less fortunate scenarios for other women with less knowledge and resources).
170. See Erdely, supra note I (noting that many women who are denied emergency contraception
are not even aware they had the option to receive it).
171. See Hirsley, supra note 168 ("[T]he urgency of information given about the pill might not be
understood by the traumatized victim, particularly within the [seventy-two] hours in which the pill
should be taken.").
172. Lori Boyer was traumatized both physically and emotionally by her attack and still suffered
from those injuries while being treated in the emergency room. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying
text.
173. Victims of Violence, Research-Incest, http://www.victimsofviolence.on.ca/rev2/index.php?
option=comcontent&task=view&id=349&ltemid=39 (last visited Feb. 25, 2010).
174. See id. (discussing the backlash victims of incest experience from their own family members
and the young age of victims); supra note 171 and accompanying text.
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bodily privacy. 175 While it is true that a state law that permits a provider to refuse to
provide emergency contraception does not explicitly forbid a patient access to
treatment on its face, the application of that law may sanction a practical denial of
access because of the time-sensitive nature of emergency contraception. 176 Thus,
the application of Maryland's statute may effectively forbid access to treatment,
which, under Eisenstadt, patients are entitled to obtain free from government
intrusion.177 Further, even if we assume-albeit incorrectly-that emergency
contraception constitutes abortion, the application of Maryland's statute may also
fail the test set forth in Roe and Planned Parenthood.78 Since the Maryland statute
sanctions a potential denial of access, the statute could constitute an
unconstitutional "effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion. ... 179 Finally, under the AMA's Code of Medical Ethics, as
well as the standard adopted by Maryland's courts for obtaining informed patient
consent, Maryland's statute should at least require emergency room providers to
inform patients of emergency contraception as a treatment option and refer patients
if providers are morally opposed to treating with emergency contraception.
180
Ambiguities in the Maryland conscience statute make its application
problematic. As a general matter, Maryland's conscience statute does not explicitly
guarantee access to emergency contraception. 18 1 So, while Maryland's statute does
not explicitly deny access on its face, any one of the three practical denial scenarios
mentioned above could become a reality as a result of the statute's application. The
Maryland conscience statute has three main ambiguities. First, the statute lacks a
definition for the phrase termination of pregnancy.'82 This ambiguity leaves the
door open for providers to apply their own definition for the phrase, which may
include the use of emergency contraception. Second, the statute does not provide an
affirmative requirement for providers to inform a patient about emergency
contraception as a treatment option. 83 Finally, the statute permits a provider to
refuse to refer a patient to another provider who would be willing to give the
patient access to treatment.'
84
175. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
176. See supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
177. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
178. Planned Parenthood ofSe. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
153 (1972).
179. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 877.
180. See infra Part III.B.
181. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-214 (2009) (protecting individuals and hospitals from
being required to perform artificial insemination procedures, sterilization procedures, or terminations of
pregnancy).
182. Id. § 20-214(a)(1), (b)(l)(i).
183. Id. § 20-214.
184. Id. § 20-214(b)(1). Although this component of the statute is not technically an ambiguity since
the statute explicitly permits providers to refuse to refer patients to other willing providers, I classified
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The first troubling component of the Maryland statute is that it does not
contain an official definition for abortion, and instead references the ambiguous
phrase termination ofpregnancy 85 Such ambiguity leaves open the door for health
care providers to apply their own definitions and tests for abortions,' 86 which may
include emergency contraception. 187 Many religious institutions and providers, like
the Catholic Church, 88 view emergency contraception as an abortifacient because
they subscribe to the belief that conception begins at fertilization. 89 Since
emergency contraception will prevent fertilization, those providers who subscribe
to this definition may be opposed to treating a patient with emergency
contraception.' 90 The ambiguity creating this obstacle could be partially cured by
amending the current statute to include a definition for abortion in conformity with
the medical community's definition.' 9' Incorporating an official definition for
abortion in the statute would help to eliminate a basis for providers using imprecise
analyses to determine whether using contraception would result in an abortion.
The second troubling aspect of the Maryland statute is its failure to include an
obligation for physicians to inform a patient about emergency contraception as a
treatment option for preventing pregnancy. 192 Without a provision that requires a
physician to inform patients about emergency contraception, a patient's treating
physician could purposely neglect to inform her of the option. 193 Standards of
medical ethics and Maryland case law command that a physician receive informed
this component as an ambiguity for the purposes of a discussion on possible recommendations for the
Maryland legislature.
185. Id. § 20-214(a)(1), (b)(1)(i).
186. Catholic hospitals often use an imprecise process to determine whether ovulation has occurred
in order to make a decision about whether to administer emergency contraception to a patient. Hirsley,
supra note 168. Even a bishop in Chicago found the process used for determining ovulation
"scientifically inappropriate and unreliable." Boozang, supra note 119, at 1451 (referencing comments
made by Bishop John Meyers in Chicago).
187. The Catholic Church, and some other religious conservative groups, define conception as the
moment of fertilization. Teliska, supra note 15, at 235. Therefore, since emergency contraception can
prevent a pregnancy by preventing implementation of a fertilized egg, providers who subscribe to the
Catholic Church's definition of conception could interpret the effect of emergency contraception to be
abortion. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. Emergency contraception comes in pill form and contains a high dose of the same hormones
used in oral contraceptives. Tomkowiak, supra note 110, at 1335. The physical results that occur after
emergency contraception is taken are not disputed. Id. at 1336. The treatment inhibits ovulation,
fertilization, and implementation of the fertilized egg. Yoder, supra note 28, at 979.
190. Teliska, supra note 15, at 235.
191. The medical community, the Food and Drug Administration, and the AMA have concluded that
emergency contraception is a form of contraception and not abortion because of the treatment's
undisputed effects. Karissa Eide, Comment, Can a Pharmacist Refuse to Fill Birth Control
Prescriptions on Moral or Religious Grounds?, 42 CAL. W. L. REV. 121, 125 (2005); Yoder, supra note
28, at 979.
192. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-214 (2009).
193. See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text.
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consent from a patient before administering treatment.194 Yet, a woman cannot give
informed consent about treatment without having full information about her
treatment options. Even assuming arguendo that emergency contraception is an
abortifacient, constitutional jurisprudence and medical ethics standards guarantee
patients at least the right to learn about the treatment option from their providers
and a right to access that is not effectively barred because of protections granted to
providers by the state.1 95 Thus, the statute should be amended to include a
requirement that physicians inform patients about emergency contraception in order
to preclude physicians from claiming exemption under the currently ambiguous
statute.
The third troublesome aspect of the Maryland statute is the exception granted
to providers from being required to refer patients they refuse to treat. The current
statute explicitly permits a provider to refuse to refer a patient for "termination of
pregnancy."' 96 Since the Maryland statute provides this exception, but does not
include a duty to refer the patient elsewhere, such a denial arguably constitutes a
government-created undue burden to accessing emergency contraception, which is
a clear violation of a woman's constitutional rights. 19 7 Additionally, an explicit
protection from having to refer patients to other willing providers conflicts with the
AMA's Principles of Medical Ethics, which obligates a physician to refer a patient
if it is in her best interest. 98 Despite a provider's rights to personally object to
specific types of treatment, a provider does not have the right to effectively restrict
a patient's treatment options' 99 -a position that even advocates for stronger
provider rights have adopted by including mandatory referral clauses in their
suggestions about reforms to emergency contraception legislation.00
194. See supra Part 1.D (discussing the requirement that patients be aware of all viable treatment
options in order to make an informed decision and give informed consent for a treatment option).
195. The Supreme Court has clarified the scope of a woman's right to include a freedom from
unduly burdensome government interference with achieving an abortion. Yoder, supra note 28, at 983-
84 & nn.39-43. While the government "is not responsible for removing obstacles" to a woman's access
that it did not itself create, id. at 984, a practical denial of access to emergency contraception because of
a government-granted exception would in fact create an obstacle in the path of a woman to receive care.
In many cases, permitting a provider to refuse access to a patient would prove to be a complete practical
denial of access. See supra note 159 and accompanying text. Thus, even assuming arguendo that
treating a patient with emergency contraception would result in an abortion, women are still entitled to
be informed about abortion as a treatment option, and thus informed about emergency contraception.
196. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-214(a)(1), (b)(1)(i) (2009).
197. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (establishing the undue
burden test).
198. See supra note 109 and accompanying text (discussing a provider's ethical obligation to refer a
patient to another provider if it is in a patient's best interest).
199. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (describing a physician's obligation to mention
viable alternative treatments even if the physician is opposed to those alternatives).




B. Recommendations for the Maryland Legislature
The Maryland legislature should amend the current statute to specifically
address an emergency room patient's practical ability to receive information and
access to emergency contraception.2 1 While a woman's right to access is important
in different life scenarios, the immediate urgency associated with a patient's
treatment in an emergency room gives rise to a specific need for legislative
protections. Because of the time sensitivity surrounding effective treatment with
20
emergency contraception, 02 the dire consequences associated with a denial of
treatment,20 3 and the delicate state of the typical patient in need of contraceptive
treatment in emergency rooms,2° the issue of a woman's constitutionally
guaranteed choice to use contraception2 0 5 must be protected by unambiguous
206legislation in Maryland.
Several states have already enacted statutory provisions that address the issue
of emergency contraception for patients.20 7 Some states have addressed the need for
201. In 2001, Maryland came close to enacting legislation expanding protections for a woman
accessing emergency contraception in hospital emergency rooms. See Susan Reimer, People Should
Know About Emergency Contraception, BALT. SUN, Feb. 26, 2002, at 1E. The Maryland House of
Delegates reviewed a bill in 2001 that would have required hospitals to either provide emergency
contraception to rape and incest victims or refer them to a provider who would. H.D. 1224, 2001 Leg.,
415th Sess. (Md. 2001). The bill never passed a committee vote, Reimer, supra, but in support of the
bill, one delegate stated that "[tihe type of health care that a crime victim receives should not depend on
what hospital she stumbles into after she's raped . I.." 1d. After the 2001 bill failed, the House reviewed
a somewhat weaker bill in 2002 that would have required all hospitals to at least give rape and incest
victims information about emergency contraception. H.D. 930, 2002 Leg., 416th Sess. (Md. 2002). The
2002 version was withdrawn after committee hearing. Md. Gen. Assembly, Bill Info-2002 Regular
Session: House Bill 930 (Dec. 12, 2002), http://mlis.state.md.us/2002rs/billfile/HB0930.htm.
202. See supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 171-74 and accompanying text.
205. See supra Part I.C.
206. Amending Maryland's statute would not impose a duty on the state to make abortions more
accessible. One commentator opposed to a statute protecting a woman's right to access contraception,
stated that such a statute would impose "an affirmative duty on the [state] ... to provide abortions or to
make them more accessible," which the Court has found to be impermissible. Yoder, supra note 28, at
983. However, an amendment to the Maryland legislation to protect women's access would not impose
an additional duty on the state; instead, less ambiguous language would enable patients to avoid
situations of practical denial of access, which Griswold and its progeny confirmed would violate a
woman's right to bodily privacy. See supra Part L.C (discussing Supreme Court precedent under
Griswold, Roe, and Planned Parenthood).
207. Connecticut, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and New Jersey are some of the states that require
emergency rooms to provide emergency contraception to patients who request it. CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 19a- 12e (West Supp. 2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. Ill, § 70E(o) (West Supp. 2009);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.4712 (West Supp. 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-12.6c (West 2007); see
also Ctr. for Reproductive Rights, Emergency Contraception for Rape Survivors,
http://reproductiverights.org/en/documentlemergency-contraception-for-rape-survivors (last visited Feb.
25, 2010) (listing all of the states that have enacted legislation requiring emergency rooms to provide
emergency contraception to patients who request it). Some states have also enacted legislation requiring
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providers to at least inform patients about emergency contraception as an option.
For example, Colorado's statute calls for licensed health care facilities to amend
their protocols to include "informing the [rape] survivor in a timely manner of the
availability of emergency contraception as a means of pregnancy
prophylaxis ....08 Illinois's statute also requires hospitals treating sexual assault
survivors to develop a protocol to ensure "that each survivor.., will receive
medically and factually accurate and written and oral information about emergency
contraception .... ,209 Illinois's statute does not exempt providers who are morally
opposed to emergency contraception from providing information to the patient
about emergency contraception as a treatment option.2 1° Massachusetts has gone
even further and enacted a provision that specifically protects female rape victims
of childbearing age.2 1t Every female rape patient of childbearing age at a state-
licensed hospital21 2 has the right "to receive medically and factually accurate
written information prepared by the commissioner of public health about
emergency contraception; to be promptly offered emergency contraception; and to
be provided with emergency contraception upon request." 2 3 Maryland should take
steps to amend its current conscience statute to provide the kinds of protections
afforded in states like Massachusetts.
In order to correct the ambiguities and shortcomings in Maryland's
conscience statute, the legislature should amend the law's language in three
fundamental ways. The legislature should first replace termination of pregnancy
with the term abortion and provide a definition for abortion in conformity with the
standards set by the medical community.21 4 The phrase termination of pregnancy is
emergency room physicians to at least inform patients about emergency contraception as a treatment
option. See id. (listing Arkansas, Colorado, and Illinois as three states that have enacted this
requirement).
208. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-3-110(2) (West 2008 & Supp. 2009). However, Colorado's
statute sill includes a provision that exempts providers who are morally opposed to emergency
contraception from being required to inform patients about emergency contraception as a treatment
option. Id. § 25-3-110(3)(a).
209. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 70/2.2(b) (West 2005 & Supp. 2009)
210. See id.
211. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 70E(o).
212. The Massachusetts statute uses the term facility to describe the treatment centers where patient
ights apply and broadly defines the term to include: hospitals, clinics, infirmaries, institutions for care
of unwed mothers, rest homes, and charitable homes for the aged, licensed or subject to licensing, by the
Department of Public Health. Id. § 70E.
213. Id. § 70E(o).
214. The FDA, AMA, and general medical community have adopted a definition for conception that
begins at the time that a fertilized egg implants into the uterine wall. Eide, supra note 191, at 125
("[Blecause the medical community equates conception with implantation, even if the fertilized egg
passes through the uterus without implanting, contraceptives do not cause an abortion because
conception has not yet occurred."); Yoder, supra note 28, at 979.
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ambiguous because of definitional disputes, 21 5 and thus lends itself to an
inconsistent application across the state of Maryland. The statute's definition of
abortion should reference the implantation of a fertilized egg as the moment of
conception and should explicitly except emergency contraception from the
definition of abortion as a form of contraceptive treatment.1 6 Although providers
may continue to subscribe to their own definitions for abortion and to their own
opinions about the effects of emergency contraceptive treatment, a clear and
decisive definition for abortion, which excludes emergency contraception, will help
to alleviate the imprecise analyses religious providers conduct to determine whether
they inform a patient about and offer emergency contraception as an option.
Second, the legislature should amend the current Maryland conscience statute
to include a requirement that providers inform patients about emergency
contraception as a treatment option if it is a medically indicated. Since a patient
must be aware of all available treatment options in order to give her informed
consent for the option selected,217 the Maryland statute should require providers to
discuss emergency contraception as an available option, even if the provider refuses
to provide the treatment himself. Emergency contraception is an effective treatment
for patients that present in an emergency room within seventy-two hours of
intercourse.21 Thus, legislation should require a treating provider to discuss
emergency contraception as an available treatment option if a patient presents
within the seventy-two-hour window of effectiveness.
Lastly, if a patient requests treatment with emergency contraception, the
reformed Maryland conscience statute should require a treating provider to either
administer emergency contraception, or to refer the patient to another provider who
is willing to provide emergency contraception within the medically indicated time
limit. At its strongest, this requirement will ensure that women requesting treatment
are able to access it during treatment in a hospital emergency room. At its weakest,
this requirement will ensure no woman is unable to access emergency
contraception through a government-created practical denial.
If a provider chooses not to treat a patient with emergency contraception the
statute should require the provider to refer the patient to another facility where the
patient can access emergency contraception in conformity with treatment time
restrictions. If the refusing provider can refer the patient to another provider within
the same institution, doing so would sufficiently satisfy the statutory referral
requirement. If no other provider in the same institution is willing to administer the
215. See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text (discussing religious conservatives as one
group that adheres to a definition for abortion that includes emergency contraception).
216. Both recommendations are in conformity with the medical community's adopted definitions
and standards. See supra note 214.
217. See supra Part I.D (discussing the AMA's ethical requirement and Maryland case law
requirement that physicians receive a patient's informed consent).
218. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
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treatment, the refusing provider should be required to refer the patient to another
provider outside of the institution who will administer treatment in conformity with
treatment time restrictions. If the patient requires transportation in order to receive
treatment by an alternative provider, the refusing provider should be required to
provide transportation and the corresponding costs should be included as part of the
patient's treatment costs accrued at her initial place of treatment. These
requirements would counter the devastating effects a provider's refusal to refer can
have on a patient and allow a provider to avoid a financial burden in order to refer a
patient. Additionally, these requirements would balance a provider's desire not to
be directly involved with the act of administering treatment,219 with a patient's right
to avoid a government-sanctioned, burdensome obstacle to access because of a
provider's refusal.
A statutory provision requiring an emergency department to transfer a patient
in order to receive emergency contraceptive treatment is not unreasonable since the
obligation would be analogous to the transfer requirements under the federal
Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA).22 ° Pursuant to
EMTALA, a hospital emergency department 22' has an obligation to treat a patient
with an emergency condition until the patient's emergency condition is stabilized,
or the hospital must transfer the patient to another emergency department so long as
the transfer can be done according to the safety requirements dictated by the
statute.222 The statute defines an "emergency medical condition" to include:
[A] medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient
severity (including severe pain) such that the absence of immediate
medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in... placing
the health of the individual ... in serious jeopardy [or] ... serious
impairment to bodily functions ....223
Although it is debatable whether an imminent pregnancy meets this definition, the
urgency associated with the seventy-two-hour window that a patient has to prevent
an unwanted pregnancy is obvious. Further, stabilized means "that no material
deterioration of the condition is likely, within reasonable medical probability, to
result from or occur during the transfer of the individual from a facility .. 224 In
the case of a rape victim in the emergency room, stabilization could include
reducing or eliminating the probability of the patient becoming pregnant as a result
of the rape. Thus, the same arguments for patient care under EMTALA apply to a
219. Yoder, supra note 28, at 1024.
220. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006 & West Supp. 2009).
221. The requirements of this section are enforceable against "participating" hospital emergency
departments, id. § 1395dd(d), which is one "that has entered into a provider agreement under section
1395cc" of Title 42, id. § 1395dd(e)(2).
222. Id. § 1395dd(b)(l).
223. Id. § 1395dd(e)(l)(A).
224. Id. § 1395dd(e)(3)(B).
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state statute that requires a hospital's emergency department to provide treatment to
diminish the risk of pregnancy or to transfer the patient to another emergency
department with the capability to perform stabilization treatment.
CONCLUSION
Access to emergency contraception in emergency rooms is an important issue
in Maryland. Prior Supreme Court precedent indicates that a woman should be free
to access emergency contraception without state-created obstacles that could
possibly bar her from accessing treatment in time for it to be effective.225 Standards
of medical ethics and Maryland case law require a physician to discuss emergency
contraception as a treatment option in order to receive informed consent from a
patient before making treatment decisions.2 26 In emergency rooms, where rape
victims and other women seeking urgent care go for treatment, access to emergency
contraception is more important than ever. Currently, ambiguities in the Maryland
statute allow too much flexibility for providers in emergency rooms to refuse to
provide or even inform patients about emergency contraception. This kind of state-
sanctioned refusal serves as the kind of government obstacle the Supreme Court
has forbidden in upholding a woman's right to bodily privacy.
The Maryland legislature should act to eliminate the ambiguities in
Maryland's conscience legislation and explicitly protect a woman's right to access
emergency contraception in Maryland emergency rooms. In order to do so, the
Maryland legislature should adopt the medical community's definition for abortion
that excludes emergency contraception. The new Maryland conscience statute
should also provide explicit protections to patients receiving emergency room care.
Physicians should be required to inform patients of emergency contraception if
treatment in each particular case is medically indicated. Finally, physicians should
be required to treat patients that request access to emergency contraception or to
refer them to another provider who is willing to administer treatment within the
effective time period of emergency contraception. These changes to the current
statute will sufficiently protect a woman's right to access emergency contraception
free from a state-sanctioned denial in Maryland's emergency rooms.
225. See supra Part I.C.
226. See supra Part I.D.
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